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Immigration Enforcement and State PostConviction Adjudications: Towards
Nuanced Preemption and True Dialogical
Federalism
DANIEL KANSTROOM*
The relationship between federal immigration enforcement and state criminal, post-conviction law exemplifies
certain inevitable complexities of preemption and federalism. Because neither perfect uniformity nor complete
preemption is possible, we must consider two questions:
First, whether (and, if so, how) state courts adjudicating
rights should account for legitimate federal immigration law
goals, such as uniformity and finality? Second, how should
federal courts deploy preemption and federalism principles
when faced with challenges by federal authorities to such
state court actions? This article offers a framework of “dialogical federalism,” seeking to normalize certain tensions
under a rubric of dialogue, rather than formal hierarchy or
efficiency. The framework respects state courts’ rights adjudication, while also taking account of the history, current
norms, structure of immigration enforcement, and contemporary models of preemption and federalism.
State enforcement agents and state courts are deeply engaged in immigration-related processes. But they often must
do so in the context of historically powerful sub-federal sys-
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tems, such as criminal law enforcement, retroactivity analysis, etc. The best state court decisions balance autonomy, fidelity to state precedent, and protections of rights with
awareness of federal concerns. There is no precise formula,
but nuanced state court adjudications should help federal
courts, when considering preemption challenges to state actions, to resist formalistic (and unrealistic) field preemption
or plenary power preemption. The benefits of this approach
could be substantial. With equal protection as a backstop, it
could empower the states to define the confines of political
communities, thereby offering a truly transformative model
of the new immigration federalism.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................490
I. PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT .......................................................................497
II. THE INEVITABLE ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS: FROM THE JRAD TO PADILLA AND ITS
PROGENY ...............................................................................512
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B. Padilla v. Kentucky and its Federal and State
Progeny ............................................................................521
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS NUANCED PREEMPTION AND TRUE
DIALOGICAL IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM ..............................530
There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes cooperation under the federal law . . .
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012).
INTRODUCTION
This article considers the relationship between federal immigration enforcement and state criminal, post-conviction law. This relationship exemplifies certain inevitable complexities of preemption
and federalism. The article’s main premise is that perfect uniformity
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or complete preemption would be simplistic, ahistorical, and ultimately impossible. Two questions flow from this: First, whether
(and, if so, how) state courts adjudicating rights should take account
of such legitimate federal immigration law goals as uniformity and
finality? 1 Second, how should federal courts deploy preemption and
federalism principles when faced with challenges by federal authorities to such state court actions? This article offers a framework of
“dialogical federalism.” This is essentially a variant of “cooperative” or “dialectical” federalism that aims to normalize certain tensions under a rubric of dialogue rather than formal hierarchy or efficiency.2 The framework takes account of the history, current
norms, and structure of immigration enforcement, as well as the
most relevant contemporary models of preemption and federalism.3
It has long been axiomatic that federal law preempts conflicting
state laws relating to immigration enforcement, even those that purport to “mirror” federal enforcement goals.4 As the Supreme Court
put it in 1875, “[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission
1

These problems are not unique to criminal law. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang,
Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrimination by the
States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 357, 360 (2002) (noting how state marriage
laws affect immigration law).
2
See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1047 (1977) (describing “a
model of hierarchical imposition of federally determined values; and a model of
fragmentation, justifying value choices by the states”); see also Catherine Powell,
Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human
Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 249 (2001) (arguing for
an approach, “premised on dialogue and intergovernmental relations as a way to
negotiate, rather than avoid, conflict and indeterminacy”). Cf. Philip J. Weiser,
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 663, 668 (2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court has suggested that [the cooperative
federalism model] best describes those instances in which a federal statute provides for state regulation or implementation to achieve federally proscribed policy
goals.”).
3
Or, as Heather Gerken has usefully pluralized, “federalisms.” Heather K.
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2012) (“It
would be useful if federalism debates were more attentive to the fact that there are
many federalisms, not one. . . . It would be useful if scholars were more attentive
to the fact that the questions federalism raises need not involve an either/or answer. Often they will involve a both/and.”).
4
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
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of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to
Congress and not to the States.”5 This model has also been applied
to deportation.6 The model is moderately stable, but—as we shall
see—there are many exceptions and pesky qualifications. Moreover,
though the recent cascade of state immigration enforcement laws
seems to have peaked; its impact on preemption doctrine and, more
broadly, on “immigration federalism” remains to be fully assessed.
The complexities of immigration preemption and immigration
federalism were apparent before—and remain so after—Arizona v.
United States, in which the Supreme Court invalidated various state
initiatives, but (provisionally) allowed state law enforcement agents
to investigate immigration status under certain circumstances.7
Though the Court saw some aspects of immigration enforcement as
“a harmonious whole,” the system is better described as “a patchwork of overlapping and potentially conflicting authority.”8
This patchwork challenges doctrinal stability and clarity. Historically, some courts and scholars have tried to meet this challenge by
5

Id.
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 727 (1893) (upholding
federal deportation law that required Chinese noncitizens to produce a “credible
white witness”).
7
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding that sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S. B. 1070) were preempted by federal law, but provisionally upholding a provision that allowed law enforcement to investigate a person’s immigration status. “This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect . . .”);
see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973, 1987 (2011)
(upholding Arizona law that mandated revocation of business licenses for employers who hire undocumented workers); see generally Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833, 1840 n.34 (1993) (noting that, though federal supremacy and strong
preemption are well-accepted, this is neither “natural nor inevitable” as a feature
of federalism).
8
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2502; Monica W. Varsanyi et al., A
Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration Federalism in the United
States, 34 L. & POL’Y 138, 138 (2012) (“Our findings suggest that immigration
federalism, when viewed through the lens of local law enforcement, looks more
like a patchwork of overlapping and potentially conflicting authority than a systematic approach to immigration enforcement.”); see also Lina Newton, Policy
Innovation or Vertical Integration? A View of Immigration Federalism from the
States, 34 L. & POL’Y 113, 117–18 (2012).
6
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differentiating pure immigration law (i.e., the control of the entry
and residence of noncitizens) from alienage law (which allows states
to regulate the rights of noncitizens in various ways).9 Such a dichotomy is workable for some purposes, as it defends the legitimacy
of federal oversight of pieces of the patchwork. But it does not help
us to differentiate legitimate state immigration enforcement (if there
can be such) from that which should be preempted.10
Uniformity is a powerful goal and a siren song in this realm.
Indeed, uniformity has been praised in recent years both by those
who oppose strenuous state immigration enforcement and by those
who support it.11 The ACLU amicus brief in Arizona v. United
States approvingly recites that, “This Court has long recognized the
special need, expressed in the Constitution, for uniformity and federal supremacy in the immigration area.”12 Similarly, the amicus
brief written on behalf of Representative Lamar Smith, et al., argues
that the Arizona legislation was “a multi-faceted effort to assist federal authorities in implementing several well-established federal
policies: removing illegal aliens from the United States and eliminating incentives that cause many such aliens to seek to remain
here.”13
This convergence could of course be explained instrumentally:
Those who oppose such immigration enforcement support federal
preemption when it seems in their ideological interest to do so.14
9

See, e.g., Varsanyi et al., supra note 8, at 154 n.2.
Some argue that “field preemption” renders all such efforts unsustainable.
See Drew C. Harris, A Supremacy Clause Battle: Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting and the Gradual Shift to State Immigration Enforcement, 32 IMMIGR. &
NAT’LITY L. REV. 837, 851 (2011).
11
See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al.
in Support of Respondent at 2, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(No. 11-182).
12
See, e.g., id.
13
Brief of U.S. Reps. Lamar Smith et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3–4, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182)
(emphasis added).
14
For a fuller explication of this instrumentalist model, see Jessica BulmanPozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2014) (noting that
partisan federalism “‘involves political actors’ use of state and federal governments in ways that articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the political
parties, and the affective individual processes of state and national identification
10
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Those who seek stronger enforcement defend state involvement by
arguing that it merely aims to assist federal authorities.15 However,
such instrumental motivations explain litigants better than judges.16
Is there a doctrinally solid and consistent theoretical model that
could better explain how the various forms of state immigration action do/should relate to federal immigration enforcement?17 The full
answer to this broad question is beyond the scope of this article.18
However, state post-conviction adjudications that implicate immigration enforcement are a good starting point for such a project.
They reveal a most salient fact: Federal immigration enforcement
already (and inevitably) involves state laws and adjudications. The
hard questions are how best to understand and how to structure this

that accompany this dynamic.”); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1528 (1994); see generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215 (2000) (examining how party politics has preserved the states’ voice in national councils by linking political fortunes of state and federal officials).
15
See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 14, at 1080–81. It could also be explained
if one side is clearly wrong, as may well be the case. My point, however, is not
about correctness, but about the appeal to uniformity by both sides. Supporters of
enforcement may also, of course, argue for robust federalism. The apotheosis of
this approach was Justice Scalia’s remarkable concurrence in Arizona v. United
States, which renders largely irrelevant all Supreme Court immigration law precedents since the Grant Administration. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(2012) (Scalia, J., concurring). By Supreme Court immigration law precedents
since the Grant Administration, I mean since Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275
(1875).
16
Though preemption theories are well-described in general as “a muddle.”
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000).
17
For an engaging dialogue along similar lines, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram
& Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2009); see also Stella Burch Elias,
The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. 703, 748–49 (2013) (“The
Supreme Court’s recent rulings in Arizona v. United States and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting portend a new era of immigration federalism, defined not by state
and local efforts to enforce immigration laws and deport immigrants, but rather by
state and local experimentation with measures intended to foster immigrant inclusion.”).
18
This is largely due to the multi-faceted nature of the state/federal relationship and the complexity of preemption and federalism doctrines.
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relationship.19 Let me be candid about the unavoidable problem of a
normative baseline: This essay seeks a doctrinal model that comports with a critique of current federal enforcement as disproportionately harsh and violative of basic human rights.20 The model proposed herein thus tends to support preemption in such situations as
the “force-multipliers” attempted in Arizona, Alabama, etc., while
counseling federal deference to state adjudications that protect basic
rights in immigration enforcement settings. The obvious challenge
is to justify this in a non-instrumentalist way.21
This article begins with an examination of the basic principles
governing federal preemption and federalism in immigration law. It
then considers the history of the relationship between state criminal
laws and federal deportation together with a more specific analysis
of the most important recent case to navigate these waters: Padilla
v. Kentucky.22 It closely examines a question that has spawned much

19
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (“[T]heories of preemption need to accept the truisms that the federal and state governments have largely overlapping jurisdictions, that each level of government is
acutely aware of what the other is doing, and that each level regulates with an eye
to how such regulation will affect the other.”).
20
See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 19 (2007); DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH:
DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 63 (2012). For a recent
report about the harshness of the enforcement system, see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, A PRICE TOO HIGH: US FAMILIES TORN APART BY DEPORTATIONS FOR
DRUG OFFENSES 79 (2015), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0615_ForUpload_0.pdf.
21
For a catalogue of federalism(s), see Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms
and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and
Temporizing Accommodations, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV
363, 371 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (“administrative federalism, cooperative federalism, competitive federalism, creative federalism, cultural federalism, dialectical federalism, dialogical federalism, dual federalism, fiscal federalism, intrastatutory federalism, noncategorical federalism, polyphonic
federalism, territorial federalism, and the like. . .[any of which Resnik has been
hesitant to assume] provides a stable and general account.”); Heather K. Gerken,
Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1914
n.169 (2014).
22
559 U.S. 356 (2010) (a noncitizen criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel about potential deportation consequences).

496

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:489

recent federal and state litigation: whether Padilla’s norms are “retroactive.”23 The Supreme Court ruled against retroactivity in
Chaidez v. United States.24 This ruling, however, does not bind state
courts due to “considerations of comity.”25 States may “give broader
effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required.”26 But
significant state variation seems uniquely problematic where a major federal enforcement system is predicated on state criminal adjudications. It is surely an oddity worth pondering that a noncitizen
who pled guilty to a drug offense in Massachusetts in 2009 may now
successfully contest deportation through state court post-trial motions, while a noncitizen who took an identical plea deal in New
Hampshire faces mandatory deportation and life-time banishment
from the United States.27
The article’s proposed framework neither fully embraces nor
completely condemns such oddities. Rather it seeks to explain why
they exist and to explore possible hidden benefits to the apparent
jurisprudential cacophony.
The essential conclusion is that state enforcement agents and
state courts are deeply engaged in immigration-related processes.
This engagement implicates normatively powerful sub-federal systems, such as criminal law enforcement, retroactivity analysis, etc.
The best state court decisions balance autonomy, fidelity to state
precedent, and protections of rights with some awareness of federal

23
I put this word in quotation marks intentionally, as some courts and commentators have seen retroactivity as an inapposite framework for the question of
whether Padilla’s norm were in effect prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
the case itself. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or
“Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give
Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 8–27 (2009).
24
133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013) (holding that Padilla v. Kentucky crafted a
“new rule”).
25
See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279–80 (2008) (“[C]onsiderations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to
a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague.”).
26
Danforth, 552 U.S. at 266.
27
Chang, supra note 1, at 360 (“[A]liens that commit the same act in different
states may face different immigration consequences because the states in which
they commit the crime may convict them under laws that define the crime differently.”).
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concerns. There can be no precise formula. When federal courts consider preemption challenges, such sophisticated, nuanced state court
adjudications should help them to resist formalistic (and unrealistic)
field preemption or plenary power preemption. The benefits of this
dialogue could be substantial, as state courts could help to develop
transformative, rights-protective models of immigration federalism.
I. PREEMPTION AND FEDERALISM IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
We will not accept an interpretation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act that permits, let alone requires, speculation
by federal agencies about the secret motives of state judges
and prosecutors.
Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
The nuances of preemption and “immigration federalism” have
spawned a robust recent literature.28 Some have argued in favor of

28
See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1673 (critiquing
“forced federalism,” which “limits states to a narrow set of enforcement decisions
based on federally defined norms.”); Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts,
101 CAL. L. Rev. 553, 553 (2013) (“This Article traces out the implications of a
world where criminal courts (especially at the state level) operate as de facto immigration courts.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights,
and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (defining immigration federalism as “states and localities play[ing a role] in making and
implementing law and policy relating to immigration and immigrants[]”); David
Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 157, 157 (2012) (examining how the intertwining of criminal law and
immigration law tends “to treat legal rules and legal procedures as interchangeable tools”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29
CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376–77 (2006)
(exploring the causes and theoretical underpinnings of the criminalization of immigration law).
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such state immigration enforcement measures as useful “force multipliers.”29 Others have opposed such measures—both on equality/anti-discrimination and federalism grounds—with equal vigor.30
Some have questioned the conventional wisdom that states are more
hostile to immigration than federal authorities.31 Indeed, contrary to
the general opposition by immigrant-rights advocates to most state
enforcement of immigration laws, some have argued that there could
be progressive benefits for immigrants from immigration-related
state actions.32

29

See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV.
179, 181 (2005) (arguing in favor of immigration-based arrests by state and local
officials); Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local
Law Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
323, 327, 329 (2005) (arguing in favor of state and local enforcement of federal
immigration law).
30
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State
Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 252–61,
291–95 (2011) (arguing that the “the mirror-image theory fails to identify a legitimate source of state authority to legislate on immigration matters”); Huyen
Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. 1373, 1377, 1401 (2006) (focusing on possible “racial profiling or other abuses of authority”); Michael J.
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 515–18 (2001) (describing
discriminatory state laws and anticipating more such laws in the future); Michael
J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1084, 1088–95 (2004) (arguing that state and local police have no “inherent authority” to enforce federal immigration laws and that they have been
preempted by federal law).
31
See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 57, 59–60, 65–66 (2007).
32
See Spiro, supra note 28, at 1636 (describing possible benefit of immigration federalism’s “steam valve” function); see also Victor C. Romero, Devolution
and Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377, 384–85 (2002) (arguing
that “devolution” could benefit same-sex partners if federal immigration law recognized same-sex unions sanctioned by states); Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 875
(2015) (seeking to fill the void in “modern scholarship that explores the power of
states to advance inclusive constructions of state citizenship”).
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Some scholars have highlighted the inevitability of federal/state
overlaps due to the nature of the immigration enforcement system.33
Peter Schuck, for example, notes that the “federalist default” arrangement involves extensive reliance “on state and local involvement, including in the enforcement of federally-promulgated
rules.”34 Clare Huntington explains that “authority over pure immigration law is shared among levels of government.”35 This, she suggests, makes “state and local involvement in immigration [] far less
suspect,” and makes possible “more nuanced debate.”36 Similarly,
Cristina Rodríguez has called for “a modus vivendi regarding immigration regulation by all levels of government.”37 Stella Burch Elias
has broadly asserted that we now live in an era of “a new direction
for ‘immigration federalism’” in which there is “ample opportunity
for different varieties of state and local engagement with noncitizen
residents.”38 This evokes a theory of federalism that recognizes, as
33

See Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2008) (arguing strongly against “structural preemption,” stating, “[o]nce it is clear that the Constitution allows a role for
subnational polities in immigration, the conventional and contested values of federalism become operable.”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local
in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 571–72, 609–10, 615–17
(2008) (arguing that all levels of government operate as an integrated system to
manage immigration assimilation); Schuck, supra note 31, at 64, 67–84 (arguing
against federal exclusivity in employment-based admissions, criminal justice, and
employer sanctions); see also Ming H. Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism: Toward A Doctrinal Framework, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1087, 1087–88
(2014) (explaining that “cooperative federalism in immigration is legally permissible and normatively desirable in some instances.”); Spiro, supra note 28, at 1627
(discussing “‘steam-valve’ virtues of federalism” in the immigration context); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.
J. INT’L L. 121, 121 (1994) (examining federal exclusivity through the lens of
international law and suggesting that “[a]s a practical matter, immigration is now
largely a state-level concern.”).
34
Schuck, supra note 30, at 65–66 (noting that “[i]ndeed, it is hard to think
of a national program (other than Social Security) that is run entirely by the federal
government without any state involvement”).
35
Huntington, supra note 33, at 791–92.
36
Id. Huntington defines “pure” immigration law as “the rules governing the
admission and removal of non-citizens.” Id. at 791.
37
Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 570.
38
Burch Elias, supra note 17, at 705 (“The Arizona Court’s reinvigoration of
the doctrine of broad federal power in the immigration arena does not foreclose all
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Judith Resnik posits, that “the domains of authority are not fixed but
renegotiated as conflicts emerge about the import of rights and the
content of jurisdictional allocations.”39
Such dynamic approaches are especially useful in this arena.
States have long been deeply engaged in various forms of immigration regulation and enforcement, though the modalities are not always as clear as contemporary anti-immigrant legislation.40 Immigration enforcement through state criminal justice systems is thus a
very well-worn path.41 Still, Cristina Rodríguez argues that a com-

state action pertaining to immigrants and immigration . . . . [it] provides ample
opportunity for different varieties of state and local engagement with noncitizen
residents—some of which will be novel and some of which will involve the further
development or redirection of preexisting laws and policies.”); see also, Peter L.
Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 869, 875 (2015) (seeking to fill the void in “modern scholarship that explores the power of states to advance inclusive constructions of state citizenship”);
see also Markowitz, supra note 32; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2074,
2081 (2013) (highlighting that “state and local immigration laws are part of an
orchestrated legislative cascade, mostly unrelated to underlying policy concerns,”
and “the inherent structure of our federalist system creates a dynamic feedback
loop whereby subfederal immigration policies hinder comprehensive federal reform efforts”).
39
Resnik, supra note 21, at 363.
40
See Jason Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C.D.L. REV. 355, 365
(2012).
41
See generally id. (noting that “the federal government primarily depends
on states and their criminal justice systems to determine in the first instance
whether lawfully present immigrants are criminals and therefore deportable under
federal law.”). Other such pathways—beyond the scope of this essay—include
marriage, divorce, child custody, adoption, and SIJ adjudications in state courts.
But see Lee, supra note 28, at 558 (noting that “Congress created an enforcement
system that attaches immigration consequences to criminal convictions without
formally empowering any party within the criminal courts to make immigrationrelated decisions” and suggesting ways to “accommodate this reality”); Peter H.
Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises
of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 458–63 (1999) (proposing a
“federalist solution” to the problem of “removing criminal aliens”). For a contrary
view, see HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., BLURRING THE
LINES: A PROFILE OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION
LAW USING THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002-2004,
29 (2005); see also Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief
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prehensive immigration system must maintain primary federal control over removal standards as an integral organizational function
without which “the system would be chaotic.”42 But, from the earliest crime-based United States federal exclusion and deportation statutes to the present, state, not federal, convictions have undergirded
the vast majority of crime-based federal immigration enforcement
actions, especially “post-entry social control” deportations.43 Put
simply, since the beginning of the modern deportation regime in the
early twentieth century, vastly more people have been deported for
violating state (and even local) criminal laws than for violating federal criminal law.44 Thus, in many respects this “chaotic” model has
long been the norm.45 Indeed, as a central feature of immigration
enforcement, it may not be chaotic at all, simply dynamic or multifaceted (or dialectical or dialogical).46
Federalism, as Judith Resnik writes, “offers an analytic and a
history of practices demonstrating the capacity to sustain toleration
within polities of plural legal norms.”47 However, there is no area of
domestic law where federalism would seem so weak—and where
preemption is more powerfully implemented—than immigration enforcement. This is our basic dilemma.

And The Lost Cause Of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 668 (2008) (critiquing the distinction between post-conviction relief that is effective for eliminating grounds for deportation and relief that is not effective).
42
Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 633.
43
See Lee supra note 28, at 571–77; see generally KANSTROOM,
DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 20 (discussing how the deportation system is one of “post-entry social control”); see also
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187,
35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 203 (1994) (noting the overlap between “alienage” law
and immigration law in practice).
44
See Lee supra note 28, at 576–77.
45
See id. at 578–79 (noting that “local prosecutors can manipulate a noncitizen’s removability by adjusting the charges supporting a conviction—by plea bargaining ‘creatively’ with the noncitizen’s lawyer.”); see also Rodríguez, supra
note 33, at 633 (describing as “chaotic” an immigration system in which the federal government does not maintain primary control over removal standards).
46
See infra Part II; see also Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 633 (describing as
“chaotic” an immigration system in which the federal government does not maintain primary control over removal standards).
47
Resnik, supra note 21, at 364.
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Federal preemption doctrine, in general, stems from the Supremacy Clause,48 and the “fundamental principle of the Constitution . . . that Congress has the power to preempt state law.”49 In the
immigration context, this has long been buttressed by notions of
“plenary” federal power, resulting in rather binary and heavyhanded models.50 Indeed, more than a half century ago, the Supreme
Court noted that exclusive federal immigration power, “has become
about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of
our body politic as any aspect of our government.”51 As the Court
reiterated in 2012, a decision on removability is especially sensitive
in that “[d]ecisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must
be made with one voice.”52 This model counsels virtually inevitable
preemption and tends to trump federalism concerns.53 It has potential virtues of predictability, clarity, and uniformity. However, as
Robert Cover and Alex Aleinikoff noted long ago, such paradigms
(in which a predominant voice is sought) imply that “conflict and
indeterminacy are dysfunctional.”54 This—to reiterate—is not the
only way to view federalism in general. Nor is it the best way to
view immigration federalism.55

48

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
50
See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601,
601–03 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court improperly used plenary power
reasoning in Arizona v. United States).
51
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
52
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012). It is not obvious, for example, that a Massachusetts vacation of a guilty plea really impacts
foreign relations.
53
See id.; see also Peter J. Spiro, Rebuttal, State Action on Immigration (Bad
and Good) After Arizona v. United States, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 106
(2012) (“By situating immigration policy within the federal government’s broad
power over foreign affairs, the Court reversed its typical preemption analysis,
which, as part of a broader federalism agenda, has been increasingly protective of
state action.”).
54
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1047.
55
See Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811,
812 (2008); Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2143 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 249 (2005).
49
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As lower courts previously held, and as the Supreme Court explained in Arizona v. United States, federal immigration law is “extensive and complex.”56 As the Court noted, “the pervasiveness of
federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration
policy to the States.”57 Of course, state laws relating to immigration
enforcement are routinely preempted if they conflict with federal
law.58 And “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every pre-emption case.”59 In the realm of criminal deportations,
however, the two spheres of state and federal law simply have not
been—and cannot realistically be—hermetically sealed from one
another.60 Thus, the “purpose” of Congress is contradictory: to
achieve federal uniformity but also to incorporate and to rely upon
state laws, adjudications, and norms.
It is thus unsurprising that, in upholding one of Arizona’s initiatives, the Court noted that “[c]onsultation between federal and state
officials is an important feature of the immigration system.”61 The
recognition of such consultation legitimates dialogue between state
courts and federal authorities. As an example, the Court imagined
that “a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be
unable to produce identification.”62 Arizona’s Section 2(B) instructs
state officers to make a “‘reasonable’ attempt to verify his immigration status with ICE.”63 However, the Court, signaling some deference, noted that “[t]he state courts may conclude that, unless the
person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may
56

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
Id. at 2500.
58
Particularly where the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Id. at 2501 (internal citations and quotations omitted). This has long been recognized as “a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute
as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Id. (citing Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 373 (2000)).
59
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 345 (9th Cir. 2011).
60
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510–11 (holding that §§ 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona’s
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S. B. 1070) were
preempted by federal law, but upholding a provision that allowed law enforcement to investigate a person’s immigration status).
61
Id. at 2496.
62
Id. at 2509.
63
Id.
57
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be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong
the stop for the immigration inquiry.”64 Indeed, the concluding paragraph of the Court’s analysis of Section 2(B) explicitly awaits a
“definitive interpretation from the state courts” with what amounts
to a hint that state courts should try to avoid a construction that “creates a conflict with federal law.”65 Thus, the state courts must (or at
least should) take federal law into account when ruling on the state
law’s scope. Conversely, federal courts should pay greater attention
to—and be less inclined to broadly preempt—thoughtful rightsbased rulings by state courts even if they may impede federal uniformity.
Clearly, this is a model of dialogue, not dualism. Robert
Schapiro has suggested that federalist dualism should be replaced
by “polyphonic federalism,” which “seeks to harness the interaction
of state and national power to advance the goals associated with federalism.”66 This is clearly applicable to immigration law enforcement.67 As Cover and Aleinikoff noted, once we reject both a “hierarchical imposition of federally determined values” and a “model of
fragmentation, justifying value choices by the states,” we can recognize that “conflict and indeterminacy” are not necessarily dysfunctional.68 Indeed, they may be productive. Values may evolve
into rights as lawyers fight about their implications in various settings. Conflicts will arise, of course, as values are interpreted differently by the two court systems. But, if federal courts can avoid imposing a solution based on crude and blunt preemption doctrines,
then “an open-ended dialogue can ensue.”69 In that way, “[t]he ‘dialectical [or dialogical] federalism’ that emerges becomes the driv-

64
65
66

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2510.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, supra note 55, at

244.
67

Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929, 935 (1997) (striking down
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on the ground that Congress cannot
“commandeer” state executive officials to carry out a federal mandate); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot
“commandeer” state lawmakers by requiring them to pass legislation dictated by
Congress).
68
See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1047.
69
Id. at 1048.
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ing force for the” more sophisticated and more legitimate “articulation of rights” that straddle the intertwined state criminal and federal
immigration systems.70
We should not ignore the difficulties of such dialogues. Any nuanced or subtle model of immigration federalism is hindered by the
contentious state of contemporary debate. The stakes in boundary
state/federal conflicts over immigration policies are high; the legal
and policy debates are fierce. Litigation between Arizona and the
United States over immigration enforcement was described by one
prominent supporter of state power as “a battle of epic proportions . . . about a state’s right to enforce the laws of this land and
protect its citizens from those who break our laws.”71 On the other
side, a leading immigrant rights advocate saw the Arizona lawsuit
as a bulwark against mob rule.72 The depth of conflict may be due
in part to “partisan federalism,” per Jessica Bulman-Pozen, in which
“federalism provides the institutional terrain for disputes that are
substantive in nature.”73 It may also be due to the influence of “restrictionist issue entrepreneurs” who target certain states and localities for political reasons, rather than due to real burdens created by
alleged federal under-enforcement.74 The Supreme Court, as noted,
70

Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 1048; see also ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 111–98, 240 (1962) (describing “passive virtues” that facilitate the conversation between courts and political actors).
71
Marc Lacey, Appeals Court Rules Against Arizona Law, N.Y. TIMES (April
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/us/12arizona.html?_r=0 (“‘This
battle is a battle of epic proportions,’ Mr. Pearce said in a statement suggesting he
was not surprised by the ruling. ‘It is about a state’s right to enforce the laws of
this land and protect its citizens from those who break our laws.’”).
72
Id. (“‘One of the reasons we have a judiciary is so that mobs don’t rule, so
that when the Legislature oversteps its bounds there is someone to stop them,’
said Omar Jadwat of the A.C.L.U. Immigrants’ Rights Project.”).
73
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 14, at 1080 (noting that partisan federalism “involves political actors’ use of state and federal governments in ways that articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the political parties, and the affective
individual processes of state and national identification that accompany this dynamic.”).
74
See S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431,
1436–46 (2012) (showing relationship between local partisanship and restrictive
immigration laws).
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ultimately recognized the inevitability of some state/federal overlaps.75 Still, we are left with the muddle that some state legislation
and some state adjudication relating to immigration enforcement
may stand, though the federal government may expressly preempt
any such efforts. Put another way, the complexity of immigration
enforcement seems to demand federal acquiescence to certain state
actions, in light not only of practicality and legitimate state interests,
but also of federalism. But a credible framework has remained elusive.76
To be sure, tension between state variability and autonomy and
federal goals of uniformity is not new in this realm. Federal legislation, agency rules, and agency adjudication have episodically aimed
to override state variation, but never with complete success. In 1959,
for example, the Attorney General ruled that state expungements of
narcotics offenses would have no effect on immigration proceedings.77 In 1990, Congress eliminated the Judicial Recommendation
Against Deportation (JRAD) that had empowered state court judges
to prevent the use of state convictions for deportation.78 Most fundamentally, in 1996, Congress sought to standardize the federal definition of a “conviction” for immigration purposes.79 Still, peculiarities remain.80 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), for example, has held that when a state court vacates a conviction for reasons
75

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting,
131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973. Kerry Abrams has referred to the Arizona decision as “a
doctrinally empty reaffirmation of federal power.” Abrams, supra note 50, at 602.
77
A—F—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 445 (B.I.A. 1959).
78
See infra Section II. A.
79
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 628 (1996) (providing a statutory
definition for the term “conviction” for immigration purposes).
80
See, e.g., a series of cases reviewing the effects of state rehabilitative statutes. Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2005); RenteriaGonzalez v. I.N.S., 322 F.3d 804, 812–14 (5th Cir. 2002); Murillo-Espinoza v.
I.N.S., 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001); Herrera-Inirio v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 299,
305 (1st Cir. 2000); Moosa v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 994, 1002 (5th Cir. 1999). Cf. Song,
23 I. & N. Dec. 173, 174 (B.I.A. 2001) (terminating removal proceedings where
defendant’s criminal sentence was reduced and the crime for which he was convicted no longer fell within the meaning of an aggravated felony); see also Martin,
18 I. & N. Dec. 226, 227 (B.I.A. 1982) (finding a defendant’s initial sentence void
and of no effect).
76
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“solely related to rehabilitation or to avoid adverse immigration
hardships,” the conviction may still justify deportation.81 But the
BIA will defer to a state court’s decision to vacate due to a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings.82
Strangely, the BIA will also defer to state courts’ resentencing of a
non-citizen from a sentence of one year to three hundred and sixty
days in order to avoid deportation consequences.83 This essay suggests that these are not merely anomalous phenomena. Rather, they
reflect the inevitably dialectical nature of federal immigration enforcement based on state criminal proceedings where basic rights are
adjudicated.
This dialectic has survived federal courts’ generally dismissive
approach to challenges to federal overrides of state post-conviction
remedies.84 The definition of “conviction” for immigration purposes
was, for a time, accepted as “a fluid one.”85 However, federal immigration agencies worried that “most states had adopted one or more
81
Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Pickering,
23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003)). Cf. Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878, 881
(B.I.A. 2006) (A “conviction was vacated by the trial court pursuant to section
2943.031 of the Ohio Revised Code because of a defect in the underlying criminal
proceedings, i.e., the failure of the court to advise him of the possible immigration
consequences of his guilty plea.” The conviction was no longer valid for immigration purposes.); Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378, 1380 (B.I.A. 2000) (A
conviction that has been vacated pursuant to Article 440 of New York Criminal
Procedure Law does not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes.). Also,
a pardon will not remove the immigration consequences of a conviction for a controlled substance offense. Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1250–
51 (9th Cir. 2008); Cade, supra note 40, at 375.
82
See Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 879.
83
See Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 174; see also Martin, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 227.
84
Such challenges are often made under the Full Faith and Credit Act, and
under the Fifth or Tenth Amendments. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (B.I.A. 1996) (Under the FFCA, a federal court generally
must give a state court judgment “the same effect that it would have in the courts
of the State in which it was rendered.”). The FFCA provides that “records and
judicial proceedings of any court of any such State . . . shall be proved or admitted
in other courts within the United States . . . . [and] shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States” as in the courts of that State.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
85
Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 514–15 (B.I.A. 1999) (noting that
“[i]n the absence of a statutory definition, this Board, with direction from the Su-
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methods of mitigating the consequences of a conviction . . .”86 Congress said the BIA in 1999 did not intend “that there be different
immigration consequences accorded to criminals fortunate enough
to violate the law” in states where certain procedures happened to
be available.87 A typical refrain was offered by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals:
[N]o provision in the I & N Act gives controlling effect to state law or requires the INS to do an aboutface if a state, pursuant to a diversionary disposition
scheme, retroactively erases a conviction.88

preme Court and the Attorney General, struggled for more than 50 years to reconcile its definition with the increasing numbers of state statutes providing ameliorative procedures affecting the ‘finality’ of a conviction under state law.”) (citing Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 901 (1955); Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 548
(B.I.A. 1988); G—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1960); A—F—, 8 I. & N.
Dec. 429, 436 (B.I.A. 1959); L—R—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 269, 270 (B.I.A. 1959);
O—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 539, (B.I.A. 1957); F—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 343, 348 (B.I.A.
1942)).
86
Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 515 (citing Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546,
550 (B.I.A. 1988)). The Board of Immigration Appeals repeatedly reiterated its
(aspirational) understanding of “a long-standing rule that [the determination of]
whether a conviction exists for purposes of a federal statute is a question of federal
law and should not depend on the vagaries of state law.” Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec.
at 551 n.6. Indeed, the Board went so far as to conclude that “the language of the
statutory definition and its legislative history provide clear direction that this
Board and the federal courts are not to look to the various state rehabilitative statutes to determine whether a conviction exists for immigration purposes.” RoldanSantoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 521.
87
Murillo-Espinoza v. I.N.S., 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001) (i.e., “in a
state where rehabilitation is achieved through the expungement of records . . . rather than in a state where the procedure achieves the same objective simply
through deferral of judgment.”)
88
Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 2000) (“To the exact
contrary, state rehabilitative programs that have the effect of vacating a conviction
other than on the merits or on a basis tied to the violation of a statutory or constitutional right in the underlying criminal case have no bearing in determining
whether an alien is to be considered ‘convicted’ under section 1101(a)(48)(A).”)
(citing United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1999); Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 521; Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103,
119 (1983); United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778, 782 (1st Cir. 1996)).
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Similarly, the Second Circuit found the BIA’s tendency to ignore
state post-conviction remedies to be “reasonable.”89 As the Second
Circuit reasoned in the context of the use of a state “youthful offender” adjudication as a prior conviction in sentencing:
[T]he “principles of federalism and comity embodied
in the full faith and credit statute,” . . . are not endangered when a sentencing court, not questioning the
propriety of the state’s determination in any way, interprets how to apply New York’s youthful offender
adjudications to a Guidelines analysis.90
The basic proposition is that “the federal sentencing court is neither refusing to recognize nor re-litigating the validity of [the defendant’s] New York state judgment of conviction or his youthful
offender sentence.”91 Rather, it is merely “acting upon the fact of
[the defendant’s] prior conviction.”92
In this model of immigration law, “from a practical perspective”
state convictions are seen as merely “a useful way for the federal
government to identify individuals who, because of their criminal
history, may be appropriate for removal.”93 This sort of “cooperative
federalism” raises at least two distinct problems. First, state processes, even those based on state constitutional conceptions of justice and fairness, are rendered irrelevant even though Congress has
expressly used state convictions as the prerequisite to many types of
89

Because it was “entirely consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the
1996 amendments to broaden the definition of conviction.” Saleh v. Gonzales,
495 F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 2007) (the definition of conviction focuses on “the original attachment of guilt (which only a vacatur based on some procedural or substantive defect would call into question) and imposes uniformity on the enforcement of immigration laws.”); see also Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266
(6th Cir. 2006); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006); Pinho
v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2005); Ramos v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 800,
805–06 (7th Cir. 2005); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128–9 (10th
Cir. 2005); Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1268–71 (11th
Cir. 2004); Murillo-Espinoza, 261 F.3d at 774.
90
United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2005).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Saleh, 495 F.3d at 24.
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deportation.94 Second, it depends (to avoid double jeopardy and
other constitutional problems) on the doctrine that deportation is
merely a civil “collateral” consequence of state criminal convictions. But this doctrine has been challenged by Padilla v. Kentucky,
which held that a noncitizen criminal defendant has a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings not
only as to the defense of the criminal case, but also as to advice about
potential deportation consequences.95
The historically blended system of immigration enforcement
thus embodies inevitable deep tensions.96 As Peter Schuck has recounted, some federalist arrangements are based on the sovereignty

94

It is not however, entirely unique to immigration law. The Supreme Court
once held that, for federal systems such as gun control, state convictions “provide
a convenient, although somewhat inexact, way of identifying ‘especially risky
people’”[sic] and therefore “[t]here is no inconsistency in the refusal of Congress
to be bound by post-conviction state actions . . . that vary widely from State to
State and that provide less than positive assurance that the person in question no
longer poses an unacceptable risk of dangerousness.” Dickerson v. New Banner
Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 120 (1983) (Firearms disabilities imposed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 (2012) applied with respect to a person who pleaded guilty to a state offense
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, when the record of the proceeding subsequently was expunged under state procedure following a successfully served term of probation.). But see the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
(FOPA), 100 Stat. 449 (1986), in which Congress amended § 921(a)(20) in response to Dickerson. The amended provision excludes: “Any conviction which
has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has
had civil rights restored . . . unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of
civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or
receive firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23,
28 (2007).
95
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369–74 (2010); see Daniel Kanstroom,
The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1468
(2011); Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress? 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305, 306
(2011); see also César Cuauhtemoc García Hernandez, Criminal Defense After
Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 479–87 (2012).
96
See, e.g., Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA), 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(providing that, for purposes of the statute, a “conviction” is defined under the
law of the jurisdiction where the proceedings were held).
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of the states.97 But many powers exercised by the states today involve
“a bewilderingly complex system of federal-state relationships in
which the states participate in programs enacted and largely funded
by Washington.”98 The relationship between state criminal law—as
informed by state constitutional adjudications—and federal immigration law, has aspects of both of these forms of federalism. Where
federal enforcement depends upon state enforcement through the
states’ police powers, the old dictum becomes especially salient that
“courts should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’
are not superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.’”99 Substantively, states are of course largely free to
craft whatever criminal/constitutional norms they choose. However,
there are deep overlaps between state criminal law and federal immigration law. State adjudicative autonomy is thus potentially in conflict with the fact that states operate under, and are obliged to respect,
certain federal immigration policies and supervision.100
It is thus clear that there has been a long and complex historical
relationship among state post-conviction mechanisms, state constitutional norms, and federal immigration law.101 Indeed, though sometimes seen as the quintessential example of an arena in which federal
power is at its zenith, immigration enforcement well-illustrates
97

Schuck, supra note 31, at 66. (“That is, state authority inheres in the constitutional settlement among the states and the people, whereby only limited powers . . . were delegated to the national government while all other powers were
reserved to the states and the people.”)
98
Id.; see also Chin & Miller, supra note 30, at 255 (“Cooperative enforcement is a familiar idea throughout our federal system and a pervasive concept in
American criminal justice.”).
99
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (citing Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565
(2009)).
100
Schuck, supra note 31, at 65; see also Schuck & Williams, supra note 41,
at 420–421 (citing Pressman and Wildavsky’s study on policy implementation in
support of the proposition that the current removal system does not make sense).
In the end, however, as Heather Gerken has noted, “[b]oth devolution and centralization are means to an end. They are, in fact, means to the same end: a wellfunctioning democracy.” Gerken, supra note 21, at 1891.
101
See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE
GUIDE 1 (2006).
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Schapiro’s polyphonic conception, in which “it is the dynamic interaction among states and the national government that forms the true
sound of federalism.”102 This state/federal relationship may be both
confrontational and cooperative, as polyphony, like dialogue, accepts both dissonance and harmony.103 Let us now consider specifics.
II. THE INEVITABLE ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS: FROM THE JRAD TO PADILLA AND ITS PROGENY
We have not expressly stated that art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] demands that defense counsel
provide defendants with accurate advice concerning the deportation consequences of a guilty plea or conviction at trial.
That such a right exists, however, is implicit . . . .
Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 995 N.E.2d 760, 771 (Mass. 2013).
When the modern post entry social control deportation system
was first crafted in the early twentieth century, federal enforcement
was mediated by a variety of state measures, including the availability of gubernatorial pardons, expungements, rehabilitative measures
and, most subtly, state adjudicative norms.104 Goals of federal uniformity have, however, long been powerful in this realm. Consider,
102

Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, supra note 55, at

249.
103

See id.
Expungement means either a statute that permits a deferred adjudication of
a conviction (in which case a judgment is never entered), or a court vacation or
setting aside of a judgment of conviction pursuant to a rehabilitative statute. As
the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[under a] ‘vacatur’ or ‘set-aside’ [statute], a formal judgment of conviction is entered after a finding of guilt, but then is erased
after the defendant has served a period of probation or imprisonment and his conviction is ordered dismissed by the judge . . . . [Under a] ‘deferred adjudication’
[statute], no formal judgment of conviction or guilt is ever entered. Instead, after
the defendant pleads or is found guilty, entry of conviction is deferred, and then
during or after a period of good behavior, the charges are dismissed and the judge
orders the defendant discharged.” Lujan-Armendariz v. I.N.S., 222 F.3d 728, 734,
n.11 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705, 708 (A.G. 2005);
104
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for example, the Attorney General’s 1960 opinion that rendered
state expungements inapplicable to narcotics cases.105 As the Attorney General argued, “to follow the Board’s view [allowing expungements to defeat deportation] would make the deportability of the alien depend upon the vagaries of state law.”106 The powerful goals of
federal uniformity were summarized in his conclusion:
It is hardly to be supposed that Congress intended, in
providing for the deportation of aliens convicted of
narcotic violations, to extend preferential treatment
to those convicted in the few jurisdictions, which,
like California, provide for the expungement of a record of conviction upon the termination of probation.107
After more than a century of evolution, most express reliance on
state remedial measures has disappeared, and the norm of federal
uniformity has clearly ascended. However, the legislative history of
the 1996 federalization of the definition of conviction sheds virtually
no light on whether congress even considered—let alone can be said
to have had an opinion about—the viability of post-conviction state
actions.108 A brief historical look at some of these measures demonstrates why it may be impossible to completely achieve uniformity,
even if Congress were to try.

P–, 9 I. & N. Dec. 293, 295 (A.G. 1961) (conviction set aside pursuant to writ of
coram nobis for a constitutional defect could not serve as basis for order of deportation).
105
A—F—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 446 (B.I.A. 1960).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
As the Attorney General recounted in Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 710,
the main focus of the 1996 legislative change was to standardize rules for determining whether a state court’s decision to withhold an adjudication of guilt prior
to the entry of a formal judgment of conviction would count for immigration purposes. See HYDE, JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828 at 199, 223 (1996) [hereinafter Conf.
Rep.].
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A. The JRAD
The history of the Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
(JRAD) offers a fascinating example of state/federal overlap.109 Essentially, the JRAD allowed a state court sentencing judge to rule
definitively against deportation, thereby trumping federal supremacy
and preemption in practice.110 For nearly a century, this was seen as
legitimate, if not essential, for many reasons including efficiency,
fairness, and federal deference to state power.111
The JRAD was first crafted in 1917 as part of a rather comprehensive reorganization of United States immigration law.112 Much
of that reorganization involved the creation of bridges and relationships between state criminal laws and deportation.113 These connections derived more from public perceptions than from strong empirical data about immigrant criminality.114 Indeed, the highly influential Dillingham Commission began its 1911 report on immigration
and crime by noting that “[n]o satisfactory evidence has yet been
produced to show that immigration has resulted in an increase in
crime disproportionate to the increase in adult population.”115 Still,
the Commission suggested that immigration had wrought certain
changes in “the character of crime.”116 The report opined that there
had been increases in certain types of violent crimes, certain “offenses against public policy” (i.e., “disorderly conduct, drunkenness, vagrancy” and “many offenses incident to city life”) and, the
109
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90
[hereinafter 1917 Immigration Act]; see also Immigration & Nationality Act of
1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988), repealed by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.
L. 101-649, § 602(b), 104 Stat. 4978.
110
See 1917 Immigration Act § 19; see also Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation
is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1330–31 (2011).
111
See Markowitz, supra note 110, at 1330–31.
112
See 1917 Immigration Act § 19.
113
See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing that “[t]he current deportation system[‘s
growth was] . . . . closely linked to the development of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) . . . . Those who today face deportation for minor crimes
would likely be surprised to learn that they bear the burden of decades of government frustration over [] well-known criminals”).
114
See id.
115
U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION COMM’N:
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME, S. DOC. NO. 61-750, at 1 (3d Sess. 1911).
116
Id. at 2.
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rather charmingly named, “offenses against chastity.”117 Indeed, the
Commission specifically noted that Native American born offenders
“exhibited in general a tendency to commit more serious crimes than
did the immigrant.”118 Nevertheless, the Commission saw it as a “serious” and “inexcusable[] defect . . . that aliens admitted to this country . . . may pursue a criminal career without danger of deportation.”119 Thus, the Commission recommended that “provision
should be made for ridding the United States of aliens who, within
a relatively short time after arrival, become criminals.”120 The outer
recommended limit was the period of naturalization, lasting typically five years.121
The Immigration Act of 1917 contained a provision that provided for the deportation of various noncitizens who were convicted
of certain types of crimes (particularly crimes “involving moral turpitude” and prostitution-related offenses) after their admission to the
United States.122 State convictions were absolutely central to this
model. The bitter aspects of state criminal processes were, so to
speak, ameliorated by the sweet. The 1917 law thus created the
JRAD and further stated that the deportation of “aliens” convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has
been pardoned.123 Thus, when the system of federal removal was first

117

Id.
Id. at 167.
119
U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION COMM’N:
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME, S. DOC. NO. 61-747, at 34 (3d Sess. 1911).
120
Id.
121
Id.; see Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, 30 VA.
J.L. & POL. 465 (2015) (suggesting a return to such a five year statute of limitations)
122
Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 28, §§ 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90 (1917).
123
Id. The later, codified version, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988), repealed by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 602(b), 104 Stat. 4978, reads as follows:
118

The provisions of subsection (a)(4) of this section [the
moral turpitude ground] respecting the deportation of an
alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply . . .
(2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall
make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing
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created, states were empowered not only to create federal deportations but to avoid them as well.
There was a deep logic to this that is worth recalling. The history
of the JRAD shows considerable recognition that the state court sentencing judge was in the best position to determine whether the sanction of deportation should be added to the criminal sanctions.124
When JRADs were invoked, they could be powerful discretionary
modes of relief from deportation. JRADs, for moral turpitude convictions, bound the (former) INS.125 Though INS retained authority
to deport on other grounds, many types of offenses were deemed
crimes of moral turpitude so the potential reach of a JRAD was significant.126 Moreover, it is apparent that state court judges (and prosecutors and defense attorneys) were acutely aware of the deportation
sanction. This leads not only to concern about it, but to ever-changing attempts to become involved with it. However, as Margaret Tay-

sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported,
due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested State, the
Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted
an opportunity to make representations in the matter. The
provisions of this subsection shall not apply in the case of
any alien who is charged with being deportable from the
United States under subsection (a)(11) of this section.
124
Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1144 (2002) (citing 53 CONG. REC. 5171
(1916) (statement of Rep. Powers) (“[A]t the time the judgment is rendered and
at the time the sentence is passed, the judge is best qualified to make these recommendations.”)).
125
Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452–53 (2d Cir. 1986) (JRAD “has
consistently been interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority
to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation.”). Accord Velez-Lozano v. I.N.S., 463 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Haller v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel.
Santarelli v. Hughes, 116 F.2d 613, 616–17 (3d Cir. 1940).
126
See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (“In the construction of
the specific section of the Statute before us, a court of appeals has stated that fraud
has ordinarily been the test to determine whether crimes not of the gravest character involve moral turpitude.”). However, convictions for narcotics offenses
were removed from the scope of the JRAD in 1956. Jew Ten v. I.N.S., 307 F.2d
832, 834 (9th Cir. 1962).
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lor and Ronald Wright have noted, the original congressional linkage between deportation and sentencing remained an unfinished
project.127 A main reason for this was the venerable doctrine that
deportation has long been formalistically viewed as a civil sanction,
not criminal punishment.128 Also, in practice, the possibility of a
JRAD did not always come to the attention of sentencing judges.129
Still, the very idea of the JRAD put considerable pressure on the
doctrine that deportation was merely a civil, collateral consequence
of state criminal convictions. Indeed, some non-citizens claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys had misadvised them about the JRAD option.130 Courts are divided on whether
this could warrant reopening a guilty plea.131 The JRAD also empowered state judges, who, in turn, could apply state and even local
norms to the federal deportation system.132 As the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals noted in its 1986 decision in Janvier v. United
States,133 the JRAD was seen by some courts as “part of the sentencing process, a critical stage of the prosecution to which the Sixth
Amendment safeguards are applicable.”134 Indeed, the Janvier court
saw deportation as inextricably linked to the underlying crime and
therefore, subject to the sentencing discretion of the state court judge
“who best knew the facts” and who may have thought that “the drastic penalty of deportation was unwarranted.”135 The JRAD remained

127

Taylor, supra note 124, at 1148.
See KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 15–20 (discussing the lack of constitutional protections afforded persons facing deportation).
129
See Taylor & Wright, supra note 124, at 1148.
130
See Janvier, 793 F.2d at 451.
131
See, e.g., Retamoza v. State, 874 P.2d 603, 607 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (surveying precedents).
132
See Janvier, 793 F.2d at 453 (concluding that JRADs were “designed to
make the total penalty for the crime less harsh and less severe when deportation
would appear to be unjust”).
133
Id.
134
Taylor & Wright, supra note 124, at 1146 (citing Janvier v. United States,
793 F.2d 449, 452–53 (2d Cir. 1986)).
135
Id.
128
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part of immigration law until its repeal in 1990.136 A House committee offered a strong volte-face from the 1917 model:
Because the Committee is convinced that it is improper to allow a court that has never passed on the
immigration related issues involved in an alien’s case
to pass binding judgment on whether the alien should
be deported, section 1504 states that judicial recommendations will no longer protect aliens from deportation . . . .137
This assertion of a technocratic norm (with implicit nods to strong
federal preemption) thus dovetailed with a substantial hardening of
deportation laws in this era, which reached its apotheosis in 1996.138
The elimination of the JRAD did not initially spawn much pivotal judicial reaction. The repeal inspired some constitutional challenges.139 The statute said that repeal took effect immediately and
applied “to convictions entered before, on, or after” the date of enactment.140 Some contended that this violated the ex post facto
clause.141 Courts, however, generally rejected such claims.142
136

Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, §§ 505(b), 602(b), 104 Stat.
4978, 5050. The INS interpreted this language to render ineffective only those
JRADs entered after November 29, 1990, when Congress enacted the JRAD repeal; any JRAD entered before that date “continues to be valid and continues to
have the effect of precluding the use of the conviction to establish deportability.”
Elimination of Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation, 56 Fed. Reg.
8906 (Mar. 4, 1991) (implementing the JRAD repeal).
137
H.R. REP. NO. 101-681, pt. 1, at 149 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6555.
138
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010).
139
See, e.g., Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
United States v. Koziel, 954 F.2d 831, 834–35 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Bodre, 948 F.2d 28, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing the fact that a JRAD motion
was issued concurrently with the criminal sentence “does nothing to alter the precept that deportation is not punishment.”); People v. Cuello, 591 N.Y.S.2d 409,
428 (App. Div. 1992); see also United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 4 (9th Cir.
1994) (treating an appeal of an injunction to enforce a JRAD order as civil, because “[t]he mere fact that the JRAD is part of the sentencing process does not
convert it or proceedings enforcing it into criminal proceedings”) (emphasis in
original).
140
Immigration Act of 1990 § 505(b).
141
See cases cited supra note 139.
142
See cases cited supra note 139.
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More recently, though, the elimination of the JRAD loomed notably large in the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Padilla v.
Kentucky.143 As Justice Stevens’ opinion recounted, the removal of
the JRAD, together with certain harsh changes enacted by Congress
in 1996, had rendered removal “practically inevitable” if a noncitizen “has committed a removable offense.”144 These changes to immigration law “dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction,” thus, highlighting the importance of “accurate legal advice” regarding deportation consequences in state court criminal proceedings.145
In addition to its powerful implications for our understanding of
the juridical nature of deportation itself (i.e., as punishment or not),
Padilla illuminates the inherent tension discussed above between
state and federal actors. Like the JRAD of old, Padilla’s norms
straddle goals of federal supremacy and uniformity and state autonomy. This becomes especially interesting when such norms derive
from state constitutions or declarations of rights. Indeed, even the
BIA—in its major opinion interpreting federal uniformity in the
meaning of a conviction—deferred to some state determinations including: “where the alien has had his or her conviction vacated by a
state court on direct appeal, wherein the court determines that vacation of the conviction is warranted on the merits, or on grounds relating to a violation of a fundamental statutory or constitutional
right in the underlying criminal proceedings.”146 The Attorney General later reiterated this interpretation, concluding that the federal

143

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363–64.
Id.
145
Id. at 364.
146
Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 523 (B.I.A. 1999) (emphasis added).
The Board did not reach the issue of the effect of “noncollateral challenges to a
conviction on these grounds that are pending in state court while an alien is in
deportation proceedings.” Id. See also Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (B.I.A.
2003) (evaluating the actions of a Canadian court which had quashed a conviction
for LSD possession without specifying why it had done so). The BIA in Pickering
concluded that if the court had quashed the conviction solely for rehabilitative purposes or to avoid immigration hardships, it would not be recognized. Id. at 624.
However, had the court redressed a “procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceedings,” then the conviction would not be meaningful for immigration
purposes. Id. But see L—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356 (B.I.A. 1954) (stating that a
144
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definition of “conviction” “encompasses judgments of conviction
that . . . have been entered but then vacated or set aside [pursuant to
an expungement statute] for reasons that do not go to the legal propriety of the original judgment and that continue to impose some
restraints or penalties upon the defendant’s liberty.”147
This approach has largely stood the test of time.148 The essential
rule now is that state post-conviction relief that is granted, so to
speak, “on the merits,” will effectively bind federal authorities and
will prevent deportation.149 If, however, a state court acts pursuant
to a rehabilitative statute or a state expungement mechanism, its action is likely to be ignored by federal immigration authorities.150
The most basic reason for this distinction was offered by the Attorney General in Matter of Marroquin: state laws that authorize the
subsequent expungement of a conviction “typically do so for reasons that are entirely unrelated to the legal propriety of the underlying judgment of conviction.”151 These reasons, in other words, do
not relate to “the factual basis for, or the procedural validity of, the
conviction.”152 When considering specific state statutes abstractly
this rule seems passably clear. But in practice, there has been much
variation. It turns out to be no simple matter to determine whether
state action is ameliorative.153 Case law varies substantively and procedurally, including who has the burden on the critical question.154

gubernatorial pardon is not rendered conditional due to the words “to prevent deportation.”).
147
Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705, 715 (A.G. 2005).
148
Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 23 (2d. Cir. 2007); Pinho v. Gonzales, 432
F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2005); Parikh v. Gonzales, 155 Fed. App’x 635, 638 (4th
Cir. 2005); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2005).
149
Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 715.
150
See Moore, supra note 41, at 668; Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 715.
151
Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 713.
152
Id.
153
See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 85–94 (4th ed.
2009).
154
See id. at 88–89.
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One cannot cite this body of case law as a stellar example of uniformity.155 Also, when we deal with state judicial determinations under such standards as “the interest of justice” the doctrinal picture
starts to look particularly murky.156
For state judges, consideration of federal goals and possible
preemption may affect, limit, impede, or even (in rare cases) expand
the protection of rights in certain state constitutional adjudications.157 This prompts variants of the questions posed in this article’s
introduction. Should state judges consider federal goals at all in
these sorts of cases? If so, how, and how much? For federal judges,
conversely, awareness of the venerable and inevitable nature of this
porosity should refine analyses of federal supremacy and preemption in immigration enforcement law. But how? In both cases, the
legislative trends are clear. The realm of “post-conviction relief”
from removal has moved from “a presumption of full faith and credit
with a few limited exceptions such as narcotics” to a rule that is virtually limited to state adjudications based on an “underlying defect
in the criminal conviction.”158 And yet, uniformity and supremacy
remain
elusive.159
B. Padilla v. Kentucky and its Federal and State Progeny
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment
norms of Strickland v. Washington160 applied to noncitizen Jose Padilla’s claim that his criminal defense counsel was ineffective due
to allegedly incorrect advice concerning the risk of deportation.161
155

See id. at 85–94.
See, e.g., People v. McLernon, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 570, 578 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually disagreed with and
overruled the BIA’s evaluation of the Canadian court’s motives in Pickering itself. See Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 271 (6th Cir. 2006) (vacating the
BIA’s decision and reversing and remanding “to the Board of Immigration Appeals for entry of an order terminating deportation proceedings and quashing the
order of deportation”).
157
See e.g., United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 344–46 (9th Cir. 2011).
158
See Moore, supra note 41, at 686.
159
Id.; Cade, supra note 40, at 381–83.
160
466 U.S. 668, 689–94 (1984).
161
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 374 (2010).
156
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Contrary to the Kentucky Supreme Court (and others), such advice
was not “categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel” even though deportation is still nominally a
civil sanction.162 As I have previously recounted, there is a lot packaged within this line of reasoning, especially as to the constitutional
understanding of deportation. “Justice Stevens’s majority opinion
cannot fully be squared with the historical, formalist relegation of
deportation to the realm of civil collateral consequences . . . .”163
Indeed, Justice Stevens spoke at the conference for which this article
was written. I had the opportunity to ask him whether he thought we
had reached a point where at least some forms of deportation should
be considered “punishment” for constitutional purposes. His refreshingly simple and candid answer: “Yes.”
Though the Padilla opinion was groundbreaking in many respects, its recognition of a duty of criminal defense counsel to advise
about deportation was not a new idea for many states.164 A general
right to effective assistance of counsel has long been mandated by
some state constitutions.165 Moreover, state courts have repeatedly
recognized that application of the standards announced in Strickland
inevitably involved nuanced applications of state norms.166 This had

162

Id. at 366.
Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, supra note 95, at
1466.
164
This is a fact of which the Court was well aware. See e.g., Brief of the Nat’l
Assn. of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 9–10, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651); see also I.N.S.
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (citing laws in eighteen states and the
District of Columbia which require “trial judges [to] advise defendants that immigration consequences may result from accepting a plea agreement”). But see Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 699 (2002) (noting that
“eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia” held
that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences
of a conviction, including deportation).
165
See, e.g., People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 334, 336 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (citing CAL. CONST., art. I, § 15, granting petition for writ of habeas corpus,
and remanding the case to the trial court to allow noncitizen defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel).
166
See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526–27 (Colo. 1987).
163
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sometimes, pre-Padilla, included a specific right to advice about immigration consequences, though courts were generally tentative to
go quite that far.167 In 1987, the Supreme Court of Colorado noted
in People v. Pozo that the justices were not “prepared to state in absolute terms,” that an attorney had a duty “to advise an alien client
of the possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea.”168 However, the application of “an objective standard of reasonable conduct” led them to conclude that the lower court’s “underlying concern over counsel’s failure to engage in rudimentary legal investigation [was] compelling.”169 This duty, said the Colorado court, did
not stem from a duty to advise specifically about deportation consequences, but rather “from the more fundamental principle that attorneys must inform themselves of material legal principles that may
significantly impact the particular circumstances of their clients.”170
The important point for our purposes is that there was long decisional history about related issues in states pre-Padilla. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion referred to this history many times, as did
innumerable amici.171
However, one of the dissenters in Pozo, Justice Rovira, highlighted two major recurring problems: finality and complexity.172
Both of these issues seem to support state court deference to federal
enforcement priorities. They might also, if too simplistically understood, lead to unwise federal court preemption decisions. Justice
Rovira recounted United States v. Timmreck,173 a 1979 Supreme
Court case in which a criminal defendant had “sought habeas corpus
relief and alleged that his guilty plea was involuntary because he
was unaware of the mandatory parole term that would result from
his conviction. The Supreme Court unanimously held that no relief
should be granted,174 concluding with a concern that ironically relied

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

See id. at 526–28.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010).
See Pozo, 746 P.2d at 533 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
441 U.S. 780 (1979).
Pozo, 746 P.2d at 533 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
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in part upon a 1971 dissent by Justice Stevens,175 destined, some 40
years later, to be the author of Padilla:
Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines
confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by
increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably
delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.176
Clearly, one way to read Padilla is as a rejection of this concern as
a general matter in favor of a more robust regime of rights protection
to be jointly (dialogically) implemented by state and federal courts.
The same is true for the problem of complexity, which was
strongly considered by Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts) in Padilla.177 They accepted a duty not to “unreasonably” provide incorrect advice.178 However, beyond that, they saw only a duty
175

United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528–29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
176
Pozo, 746 P.2d at 533 (Rovira, J., dissenting) (quoting Timmreck, 441 U.S.
at 784 (1979)). It may come as a surprise to some readers to consider how Justice
Stevens viewed such questions early in his career. His dissent began with the
proposition that, “[f]undamental fairness may require discussion of certain important consequences in specific cases, but a rigid rule that makes a guilty plea
vulnerable whenever a trial judge fails to supplement counsel’s advice with an
enumeration of all significant consequences of the plea is neither necessary to the
maintenance of civilized standards of procedure nor desirable.” United States v.
Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He then continued, “[t]he ‘consequences’ of the plea of guilty which relate to voluntariness,
and therefore have constitutional significance, are consequences of the plea rather
than consequences of the conviction. . . . The consequences of conviction have a
different significance. They relate to the wisdom of a decision to plead guilty rather than to the voluntariness of the decision. A variety of factors enter into the
exercise of judgment which produces that decision. Among them are counsel’s
appraisal of the likelihood of a successful defense, the admissibility of critical
items of evidence, the question whether the accused can conscientiously make a
false denial of guilt, the opprobrium that may result from a public trial, an estimate
of the sentence which the judge may impose, and the chance of probation or parole. An erroneous appraisal of any of those factors affects the wisdom of the plea,
but does not make it involuntary.” Id. at 530. Justice Stevens also noted that “[t]he
most effective safeguard against manifest injustice is competent counsel.” Id. at
535.
177
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 375–88 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
178
Id.
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to “advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse
immigration consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this
issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney.”179 Because
of the complexity of immigration law, they did not agree “that the
attorney must attempt to explain what those consequences may
be.”180 “Incomplete legal advice [by criminal defense lawyers who
are not experts in immigration law]” they wrote, “may be worse than
no advice at all because it may mislead and may dissuade the client
from seeking advice from a more knowledgeable source.”181 This is
a legitimate concern, to be sure. But, it supports a right to deportation counsel, not a depreciated duty standard for the only lawyer
who may actually be available.182
As state courts began to apply and interpret Padilla’s norms, it
is unsurprising that their readings varied. The particularly hard question was that of retroactivity. Here, per Teague v. Lane,183 courts
must consider whether the Court’s criminal procedure decisions are
“novel.”184 When the Court announces a “new rule,” a person whose
conviction is already final may not benefit from the decision in a
habeas or similar proceeding.185 Under Teague’s model, “a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation” on the government.186 In another formulation, “a case
announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”187 A
holding is not so dictated, the Court later clarified, unless it would
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Id. at 382.
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Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, supra note 95, at
1467–69.
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489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013) (“Teague makes
the retroactivity of our criminal procedure decisions turn on whether they are
novel.”).
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Id. Teague contained two exceptions: “watershed” rules and rules placing
“conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
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Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
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Id. (emphasis in original).
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have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”188 Teague also made
clear that a case does not “announce a new rule, [when] it ‘[is]
merely an application of the principle that governed’” a prior decision to a different set of facts.189 Clearly, the application of Teague
to Padilla was not going to be a simple task, owing to the complexity
of the constitutional status of deportation.
The Court undertook this task in Chaidez v. United States, and
concluded that “Padilla would not have created a new rule had it
only applied Strickland’s general standard to yet another factual situation—that is, had Padilla merely made clear that a lawyer who
neglects to inform a client about the risk of deportation is professionally incompetent.”190 “But Padilla,” wrote Justice Kagan, “did
something more.”191 The case, as noted above, “considered a threshold question: Was advice about deportation ‘categorically removed’
from the scope of the Sixth Amendment as a ‘collateral consequence’ . . . ?”192 On this view, the Padilla Court had answered “a
question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach that we had left open,
in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions.”193 However one
views Chaidez, its retroactivity reasoning only binds federal courts.
As noted above, this is due to “considerations of comity,” recognized by Danforth v. Minnesota.194 States may “give broader effect
than federal courts do to new rules of criminal procedure.”195 But
how should they do so? How much should uniformity count in the
calculus when immigration federal enforcement is affected by a
state court retroactivity ruling?
Some state courts had answered the basic question before
Chaidez. The Maryland Supreme Court, for example, concluded that
“Padilla did not ‘overrule[] prior law and declare[] a new principle
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Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 528 (1997).
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216–17
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of law.’”196 “Rather, Padilla applied ‘settled precedent [i.e., Strickland] to [a] new and different factual situation[],’ and, therefore, that
decision ‘applies retroactively.’”197 Since Chaidez, the calculus for
some state courts has changed. Some courts, highlighting uniformity
and finality, have simply deferred to the federal system.198 For example, in Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction, the Connecticut Supreme Court expressly rejected petitioners’ argument that “the
state’s interest in fairness and due process protections weighs more
heavily than uniformity with the federal standard.”199 Rather, the
Court offered an extended argument that Padilla was a “new rule”
and that Chaidez, therefore, was correctly decided.200 The Connecticut Court also noted that “the state’s interest in fairness and due
process protections must be balanced against the importance of the
finality of convictions.”201 The Court specifically agreed with the
Supreme Court’s observation in Teague that “[w]ithout finality, the
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”202
Other state court decisions defer much less to the federal system,
both as to the application of Teague as understood in Chaidez and
as to federal enforcement uniformity goals more generally. For example, in Commonwealth v. Sylvain, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) highlighted the “general principle that States are
independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce

196
Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 925 (Md. 2011) (quoting State v.
Daughtry, 18 A.3d 60, 78 (Md. 2011)).
197
Id. (citing Potts v. State, 479 A.2d 1335, 1341 (Md. 1984)). However,
“[o]ur research discloses several reported appellate court decisions holding that Padilla does not have retroactive application.” Id. at 924 n.7 (citing United States v.
Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011), Chaidez v.
United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So. 3d 868 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Gomez v. State, No. E2010-01319-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL
1797305 (Tenn. Crim. App., May 12, 2011); Miller v. State, 196 Md. App. 658, 11
A.3d 340 (2010)).
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Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)).
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their own laws as long as they do not infringe on the [F]ederal constitutional guarantees.”203 Thus, “considerations of comity militate
in favor of allowing [S]tate courts to grant [collateral] relief to a
broader class of individuals than is required by Teague.”204 The SJC
thus saw “an important distinction between the existence of a Federal substantive right or remedy, the contours of which are fixed by
Federal law, and the procedural availability of such a right, the scope
of which may be set by State law.”205 Based on this authority to conduct an independent review, the SJC did not see itself as required
“to blindly follow that court’s view of what constitutes a new
rule.”206 As the Maryland Supreme Court had boldly asserted,
“[e]ven if the Supreme Court ever were to hold that Padilla is not
retroactive under Teague, that holding would have no adverse effect
on our analysis here.”207 This seems exactly right as a model for
proactive dialogical federalism. The state court, operating in a
rights-protecting mode, is applying its own norms. It does this with
awareness of—but without excessive deference to—federal models
of retroactivity or concerns about uniformity.
Similar examples of state court autonomy arise around the problem of proving “prejudice.”208 Padilla, as noted, applied the twopart test of Strickland.209 This demands proof, first, that trial counsel’s performance failed to meet “prevailing professional norms”
and, second, that the deficient performance actually prejudiced the
defendant.210 This latter prong, according to some courts, requires
state courts to assess whether a defendant “might rationally be more
concerned with removal than with a term of imprisonment.”211 Note
203
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See Zemene v. Clarke, 768 S.E.2d 684, 691–92 (Va. 2015) (explaining that
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is violated by failure
to advise about the possible immigration consequences of a conviction) (quoting
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011)); see also People v.
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the important implication here: Such an inquiry clearly demands
some understanding and application of immigration law, both abstractly and as likely to be applied by federal authorities. A New
York appellate court concluded, for example, that “the strength of
the People’s evidence, the potential sentence, and the effect of prior
convictions” must be weighed against a variety of immigration law
factors, including, for example, whether, “an alien has significant
ties to his or her country of origin, or has only resided in the United
States for a relatively brief period of time, or has no family here.”212
In such cases, “a decision to proceed to trial in lieu of a favorable
plea agreement may be irrational in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt and a potentially lengthy prison sentence.”213 However, for a long-term lawful permanent resident, the calculus might
well be different.214
Conversely, some state courts focus almost exclusively on the
sentence, rather than on the removal.215 Even those courts that applied the prejudice prong this strictly, however, cannot avoid at least
some inquiry into immigration law, per the logic of Padilla.216
The most impressive state court decisions navigate between state
norms and respectful awareness of federal enforcement realities. In
Commonwealth v. Marinho, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d 120, 124–25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). For an excellent exegesis of this case, see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, NY APP CT: Padilla
Prejudice Inquiry Considers Defendant’s Desire to Remain in USA,
CRIMMIGRATION.COM (July 19, 2012, 9:00 A.M.), http://crimmigration.com/2012/07/19/ny-app-ct-padilla-prejudice-inquiry-considers-defendantsdesire-to-remain-in-usa/.
212
Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
213
Id.
214
Though this too depends on a nuanced evaluation of many factors. See,
e.g., Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing the defendant’s ineffective assistance coram nobis claim based on Padilla that failed
because the evidence of guilt was “overwhelming” and the defendant faced a
longer prison term along with removal if convicted after trial); see also Neufville
v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 614 (R.I. 2011) (stating that no prejudice is shown if the
defendant could have received a longer sentence at trial than by plea).
215
Neufville, 13 A.3d at 614 (“[W]hen counsel has secured a shorter sentence
than what the defendant could have received had he gone to trial, the defendant
has an almost insurmountable burden to establish prejudice.”) (citing Rodrigues
v. State, 985 A.2d 311, 317 (R.I. 2009)).
216
See, e.g., id.
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Court considered the duties of defense counsel, post-Padilla.217 The
majority opinion is fascinating in that it takes account of the federal
system. But it does so with little deference to federal enforcement
goals of uniformity or finality. Put another way, the SJC offers what
amounts to a Massachusetts take on immigration enforcement
through a very broad reading of Padilla. As the SJC put it,
Underlying the Supreme Court’s decision that deportation consequences are not “collateral” to the criminal justice process and thus not removed from a
noncitizens’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a
deep appreciation of the “seriousness of deportation”
for noncitizen defendants. Indeed, “[p]reserving the
client’s right to remain in the United States may be
more important to the client than any potential jail
sentence.”218

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS NUANCED PREEMPTION AND TRUE
DIALOGICAL IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are
to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.
James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, in THE FEDERALIST 308,
313 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
The baroque relationship between federal immigration enforcement and state criminal law demands hard thinking about both
preemption and federalism.219 The best doctrinal models should facilitate cooperation and “tolerate tension.”220 The latter is especially
important in the realm of claims regarding rights. A fruitful starting
217
218
219
220

Commonwealth v. Marinho, 981 N.E.2d 648, 657 (Mass. 2013).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
See Cade, supra note 40, at 407–10.
Rodríguez, supra note 33, at 610.
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point is what Heather Gerken has termed “the power of the servant.”221 States exercise power in cooperative regimes, as federal
“servants,” not as separate sovereigns.222 As administrators of the
federal regime, states often have a great deal of discretion in carrying out federal policies in “the nooks and crannies of the administrative system.”223 Power of this type looks more like that
“wield[ed] . . . [by] . . . a street-level bureaucrat” than that exercised
by a separate and autonomous government.224 Thus, state power depends on “integration and interdependence.”225 This model accounts
for much real-world state power in immigration enforcement. However, viewing state courts applying state criminal and state constitutional norms as merely servants in “a complex amalgam of state and
local actors who administer national policy” undervalues both state
normativity and state historical authority.226
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has adopted substantial aspects of the Padilla opinion and made them central to its own
state constitutional analysis. While one may (as I do) applaud this
approach, it requires some defense. The best defense is this: It is
clear from Arizona v. United States that State action related to immigration enforcement may neither expressly conflict with federal
enforcement priorities nor may it contravene fundamental constitutional rights. This is why the Court only tentatively upheld Arizona’s
SB 1070, Section 2(B).227 Constitutional conformity requires state
enforcement agents and state courts to be deeply engaged in immigration-related processes. But they often must do so in the context of
historically powerful sub-federal systems, such as criminal law enforcement, retroactivity analysis, etc. Thus, the best state court decisions balance autonomy, fidelity to state precedent, and protections
of rights with awareness of federal concerns. There is no precise formula, but nuanced state court adjudications should help federal
221
Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 38 (2010).
222
See id. at 38–39.
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224
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See supra Part I (discussing the decision in Arizona v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 2492 (2012)).
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courts, when considering preemption challenges to state actions, to
resist formalistic (and unrealistic) field preemption or plenary power
preemption. Moreover, the benefits of this approach could be substantial. With equal protection as a backstop, it could empower the
states to “define the boundaries of their own political communities”
thereby offering a truly transformative model of the new immigration
federalism.228
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Markowitz, supra note 38, at 877.

